01.Nov.2006: Election Observation #2

Written by: Stephen Schuck on Nov 1, 2006 9:21 PM EST

Preliminaries:

My apologies for using (for the first time) a feature that DfA-Link provides for individually addressing group messages. Seeing that, many thought that they were unique recipients. I won't do that again.

Dem Election Observation Coordinator and DfA-mster Roni Beall clarified the following points:

1) Observation space at each work site is limited, about enough for two people, of which space should be left for a Rep, i.e., Dems should have no more than one observer at each site at any time, the reason for Roni's schedule. Through election day (07.Nov) the process will be running in two different places (Auditor's office and basement), so two observers can be accomodated.

2) Standard tasks and exception handling are handled by a variety "Boards" (two or more people performing a common task). Most perform nearly mechanical tasks, with little room for significant judgement. Significant judgement issues are sent to the "Canvassing Board", which is comprised of the Auditor (contrary to what I said last time) and several other county functionaries (not known to me at the moment).

Subsequent questioning about the number of different ballot formats produced: A) Ten of Whatcom County's 119 precincts are "split" between fire districts, sewer districts, water districts, levee districts, or other entities that have elected offices, leading to a current total of 129 separate ballot-able entities. Election characteristics determine which of these entities have identical ballot formats. In the coming 07.Nov.2006 election there are 16 separate ballot formats, even though ballots are specifically printed for each precinct (identified by the tear-off tab at the top). It doesn't stop there. For each precinct, additional ballots are separately identified as provisional, duplicate, and (durn, senior moment). They are all printed in Everett at a state approved facility.

Episode #1 ended with the ballot in a randomly-sized (~75 - ~115) batch that had been opened, scanned into the computer, and then signature checked against computer signature images from the voter registration forms. We had noted a small degree of judgement in the signature matching process, although the personnel prefer not to take responsibility for deciding "anomolies", which are sent to the canvassing board for decision and (in Whatcom County) an effort to contact the voter to verify the signature. That "exception processing" produced a small amount (average ~1 per batch while I watched) of "leakage", which was noted on the batch's control sheet. This process occurs entirely in the Auditor's office on the first floor. Fireproof vaults on each floor store all materials under lock and seal while they are not being processed.

This episode begins in the Courthouse basement, home to the remainder of the process. We are observing the "Opening Board", which receives batches of unsealed outer envelopes whose contents are intact. Here the inner security envelope is removed from the outer envelope. The outer envelopes are lined up and checked (by looking through the hole) to assure that there are no contents, then bundled, identified with their batch number and stored. The batch (now completely anonymous) is run through a machine that unseals the security envelope by slicing off the top edge. An Opening Board member then removes each ballot from its security envelope and places the security envelope (now without any value) in a box for storage and later recycling. The ballot is unfolded, flattened, cleaned (many people have trouble tidily tearing off the top tab) and scanned for errors that might cause problems during the counting process. Because processing a reject is a very labor intensive process, potential rejects are identified before they can interrupt the counting process. This is very important, because no ballots are counted before election day and everyone wants their results election evening (~60,000 ballots to count in 11 hours, ~2,000/hour/machine including inter-batch down-time).

One problem with mail-in voting is that there is no feedback for people who mess up their ballots. Thus, the highest leakage rate occurs in the Opening Board. There are three principal types of leakage: A) obviously invalid ballots according to a set of state-mandated (reasonable, to me) guidelines; B) otherwise valid ballots with instances of unclear intent (also state-mandated); C) valid ballots with clear intent, but execution that would probably confuse a counting machine. Type A) and B) exceptions are removed from the batch (the batch count is reduced accordingly) and sent to the Canvassing Board for final decisions. Type C) exceptions are moved to the front of the batch and each given an explanatory notation. A finished batch without a type C) exception is sent to counting (with a group cheer - a rare occurence). Other batches go to the Duplication Board. This inspection process is quite consciencious, since a failure here may be responsible for counting machine rejects and delays, and control sheet signatures clearly indicate the person responsible.

At the end of the last episode we noted the preparation of a ballot supply for the Duplication
Board. These ballots are identical to the original ballots, except that they contain the word
"duplicate" near the top and contain a box near the bottom for a control number and two sets of
initials. There may be more than one Duplication Board, each consisting of two people. They will (somehow) determine the precinct of the faulty ballot and retrieve the appropriate duplicate blank ballot, copy the faulty ballot contents onto the blank, enter the duplication in a control log, enter a control number from the control log onto both the faulty and duplicate ballot, sign the duplicate, remove the faulty ballot from the batch and place it with the control sheet, and place the duplicate in the batch. The batch count does not change. All pieces are linked for easy retrieval and normally kept under lock and seal.

This very labor intensive process provokes continual admonitions from election workers to
"follow directions". People thinking "dark black", use a Sharpie, which bleeds through to the back and automatically forces duplication. Pencil graphite will transfer across to any surface that it is folded against, forcing duplication. "Draw a single line from one part of the arrow to the other" does not preclude filling in the entire thickness of the arrow, but leaving holes within the fill-in sends the ballot to duplication, as does drawing a circle around the arrow and any number of other ingenious creations of the human mind. Filling in the ballot at breakfast seems to be another culprit, as corn flakes and grease spots promptly provoke duplication. Thinking can also be a culprit, if a pen point resting somewhere on the ballot produces a spurious dot. As a guestimate, it seemed to me that something like 5% of the ballots were being duplicated (a huge cost).

With its duplicates completed, the batch goes to counting.

This morning I had the opportunity to watch the Logic and Accuracy test of the three Sequoia A-400 counting machines. Each has its own computer screen and communicates with a server (and the server's "hot backup"), all isolated in the normally locked counting room and not communicating with any device outside the counting room. The purpose was to demonstrate to a representative of the WA Secretary of State's office that the machines were properly counting a test batch of filled-in ballots representing all ballot types, precincts and races. Three officials (Auditor included) and three observers (2xDem, 1xRep) attended. The products were a list of the ballot contents and a list of the machine results, showing no difference. The test batch was then sealed and stored in the vault for later use if necessary. The counting room was locked upon departure. It is only used for counting ballots.

As always, my responsibilities were to simply observe, not interact with the staff, ask clarifying questions only to the supervisors, and be interested. This may be the last episode, time will tell. I hope to see you participating at the next election, if not before. It's your Democracy.

TAFN

Steve Schuck, "Organizer", DfA-Bellingham

Don't forget Citgo - Northwest at Birchwood, also in Ferndale - non-Arab gasoline (and decent
prices)

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